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Consolidation among banking institutions has sub-
stantially changed the structure of the banking indus-
try. Between 1975 and 1997, the number of commer-
cial banks and savings associations declined more
than 40 percent. Most of this change was due to
mergers and acquisitions, though in some years fail-
ures and liquidations were also important. Recent
mergers and acquisitions have had particularly siz-
able effects on the shape of the industry, as many
have involved the nation’s largest and the most geo-
graphically diverse banking institutions.
Over the same broad period, the market for home
mortgage lending has changed substantially. Notably,
home mortgage lending is no longer primarily the
province of banking institutions operating in the
communities in which they have banking ofﬁces.1 In
recent decades, mortgage and ﬁnance companies and
banking organizations operating outside their local
communities have gained a signiﬁcant share of the
mortgage market.2 Today, fewer than half of all home
mortgage loans extended in any given community are
originated by banking organizations with banking
ofﬁces in that community.
These changes have fueled debate regarding their
effects on the provision of home mortgage loans. One
particular concern is that, as a consequence of these
changes, lower-income and minority borrowers and
borrowers in lower-income and minority neighbor-
hoods may face reduced access to mortgage credit. In
part, this concern reﬂects the belief that a shift away
from lending by institutions with local banking
ofﬁces and acquisitions of small community-based
banking institutions by large regional or national
organizations may result in a transfer of decision-
making authority from those familiar with the needs
of local communities to those less knowledgeable
about, and thus less responsive to, such needs. This
article explores this issue by examining the relation-
ship between consolidation among banking organi-
zations in local markets and changes in home pur-
chase lending over the 1993–97 period. We examine
changes in total lending as well as changes in lend-
ing to lower-income and minority borrowers and
neighborhoods.3
Previous research has considered the effects of
consolidation on various aspects of banking, includ-
ing small business lending, product pricing, and the
geographic distribution of banking ofﬁces.4 These
studies indicate that, in some cases, consolidation
may signiﬁcantly affect the provision of ﬁnancial
1. In this article, the term banking institution refers to commercial
banks and savings associations (savings banks and savings and loan
associations). It does not include credit unions and mortgage or
ﬁnance companies. The term banking ofﬁce includes all locations
qualifying as separate deposit-taking ofﬁces under federal guidelines.
2. In this article, the term banking organization refers to commonly
owned commercial banks and savings associations and their subsidi-
aries and afﬁliates, including, for example, mortgage and ﬁnance
companies. Generally, a banking organization with multiple banking
institutions is termed a bank or thrift holding company.
3. Loans involving borrowers with income below 80 percent of the
current-year median family income of their respective metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) were classiﬁed as loans to lower-income
borrowers. Loans to black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, and
‘‘other race’’ borrowers were classiﬁed as loans to minorities. Infor-
mation on the census tract location of the property being purchased
was used to determine which loans were originated in lower-income
or minority neighborhoods. Loans for properties in census tracts
whose 1990 median family income was less than 80 percent of the
1990 median family income of their MSA were classiﬁed as loans to
lower-income neighborhoods. Similarly, loans for properties in census
tracts with more than 20 percent minority residents in 1990 were
classiﬁed as loans to minority neighborhoods.
4. See, for example, Allen N. Berger, Anthony Saunders,
Joseph M. Scalise, and Gregory F. Udell, ‘‘The Effects of Bank
Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending,’’ Journal of
Financial Economics, vol. 50 (February 1999); Joseph Peek and
Eric S. Rosengren, ‘‘Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending:
It’s Not Just Size That Matters,’’ Journal of Banking and Finance,
vol. 22 (August 1998), pp. 799–820; Paul S. Calem and Leonard J.
Nakamura, ‘‘Bank Branching and the Geography of Bank Pricing,’’
Review of Economics and Statistics (forthcoming); Timothy H. Han-
nan and Robin A. Prager, ‘‘Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Gener-
ate Signiﬁcant Price Effects? Evidence from the Banking Industry,’’
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 46 (December 1998), pp. 432–
52; Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B.
Canner, ‘‘Changes in the Distribution of Banking Ofﬁces,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 83 (September 1997), pp. 707–25; and
Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B.
Canner, ‘‘Consolidation and Bank Branching Patterns,’’ Journal of
Banking and Finance, vol. 23 (February 1999).services. This article extends the line of research by
exploring the relationship between consolidation and
lending to purchase homes.
This article also examines a related issue. Banking
institutions have a legal responsibility to help serve
the credit needs of their local communities—those
areas in which they operate banking ofﬁces. The
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977
encourages banking institutions to help meet the
credit needs of their local communities, including
those of lower-income borrowers and of borrowers
residing in lower-income neighborhoods.5 Because
credit availability is believed to be essential to the
economic health and vitality of neighborhoods, we
also examine the relationship between consolidation
and changes in home purchase lending by institutions
in those areas where they have CRA responsibilities.
Little previous research has been done on this nar-
rower issue.
Until recently, only limited information has been
available to systematically assess these issues. The
analysis in this article relies on a new, specially
constructed database that uses information on merg-
ers, acquisitions, and failures of commercial banks
and savings associations and data on the location
of banking ofﬁces and neighborhood economic and
demographic characteristics. These data are com-
bined with data obtained pursuant to the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA) for the years 1993
through 1997 on home purchase lending.6
OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS
When measured at the market (county) level, the
level of consolidation activity among banking organi-
zations appears to have had little relationship to
changes in home purchase lending, both overall and
to lower-income and minority borrowers and neigh-
borhoods. This ﬁnding suggests that, in general, con-
solidation has not had signiﬁcant anticompetitive
effects on home purchase lending and that lending to
lower-income and minority borrowers and neighbor-
hoods has not been adversely affected by consolida-
tion. This result holds despite the fact that consoli-
dating organizations reduced their home purchase
lending substantially in those areas in which they had
banking ofﬁces. It appears that this reduction was
more than offset by expanded home purchase lending
by banking organizations in areas where they did not
operate banking ofﬁces and by independent mortgage
and ﬁnance companies and credit unions. In particu-
lar, consolidating banking organizations expanded
their lending dramatically in areas where they did not
operate banking ofﬁces. Thus, the very organizations
that reduced their lending in markets where they
operated ofﬁces were the organizations that expanded
most in other areas. This result suggests that a driv-
ing force underlying changes in the home pur-
chase lending market has been a desire by banking
organizations to diversify their lending activity
geographically.
Although banking institutions involved in consoli-
dation reduced their overall lending in the communi-
ties where they had banking ofﬁces, this reduction
did not disproportionately affect their lending to
lower-income and minority borrowers and neighbor-
hoods. The analysis shows that the typical consolidat-
ing organization generally increased the proportion
of loans it extended to each of these groups within
its local communities. These results are consistent
with the view that the CRA has been effective in
encouraging banking organizations, particularly those
involved in consolidation, to serve lower-income and
minority borrowers and neighborhoods.
A full understanding of these relationships requires
a broader analysis and is beyond the scope of this
article. For example, loan pricing, the complexity of
product offerings, and the varied motivations driving
consolidation must all be investigated fully to reach
more deﬁnitive conclusions about the effects of con-
solidation on home purchase lending. It should also
be emphasized that the results presented here reﬂect
aggregate trends and may not apply to any particular
market or consolidation.
TRENDS IN BANKING CONSOLIDATION
Over the past twenty years, the number of banking
institutions declined substantially, from 18,679 in
5. The CRA directs the federal banking agencies to evaluate each
institution’s performance in meeting its community’s credit needs and
to consider this performance when acting on applications for mergers
and acquisitions. For a discussion of the Community Reinvestment
Act and the implementing regulation, see the Federal Reserve Press
Release, April 24, 1995. Revisions to the implementing regulation in
1995 include performance tests that consider an institution’s record of
lending both to lower-income neighborhoods and to lower-income
borrowers.
6. Although HMDA data on home purchase lending in metropoli-
tan areas have been collected since 1977, 1993 is selected as the initial
year for the analysis for two reasons. First, information on the income
and race or ethnic origin of borrowers has been included in the
HMDA data only since 1990, which precludes the analysis of the
effects of mergers on borrowers arrayed by these characteristics
before that year. Second, 1993 is the ﬁrst year the HMDA data include
the lending activity of most of the nation’s most active independent
mortgage companies—ﬁrms that extend about one-third of the home
purchase loans in metropolitan areas. Analyses that exclude such
active mortgage lenders would provide only a partial, and potentially
distorted, picture of the mortgage market.
82 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 19991975 to 11,077 in 1997—a decline of more than
40 percent. Just since 1993, the number of institu-
tions has dropped about 18 percent. Consolidation
during the 1980s and early 1990s was associated with
a quickening pace of merger and acquisition activity
along with substantial numbers of failures and liqui-
dations. More recently, the decline in the number of
banking institutions has been overwhelmingly the
result of mergers and acquisitions. From 1993
through 1997, the number of banking institutions
acquired in a merger or acquisition totaled 2,839, or
21 percent of all institutions. Over the same period,
only 40 institutions were liquidated, and 431 new
institutions were formed.
Consolidation in the banking industry has been
driven in important ways by technological advances,
globalization of ﬁnancial services markets, and
efforts to increase efﬁciency, reduce costs, or gain
competitive advantage. Besides the effects of these
economic factors, the pace of consolidation has
accelerated because of the relaxation of regulatory
restrictions on the ability of banking organizations
to expand geographically and to establish banking
ofﬁces, although some legal restrictions, including
federal antitrust laws, continue to restrict potential
combinations.7 (See box ‘‘Geographic Restrictions in
Banking.’’)
Much of the industry’s consolidation has involved
mergers and acquisitions among banks that had been
operating in different local markets within the same
state, in different states within the same geographic
region, or even in different regions. As a result,
consolidation has been accompanied by a substantial
broadening of the geographic reach of many banking
organizations, so that many of the nation’s largest
organizations now operate across entire regions or
even across multiple regions of the country. Whereas
before 1980 only a handful of banking organizations
operated in more than one state, by mid-1998, more
than one-quarter of banking institution assets were
owned by banking organizations with headquarters
in another state. Moreover, a substantial increase has
occurred in the share of total banking institution
assets controlled by the largest banking organiza-
tions.8 In many cases, mergers have had a signiﬁcant
effect on concentration in local banking markets,
although, on average across the United States, local
market concentration has not increased substantially
over time. One might expect this broad restructuring
of the industry to have potential implications for
retail banking relationships, such as the provision
of ﬁnancial services to lower-income and minority
communities.
7. The two main federal antitrust laws are the Clayton Act of 1914
and the Sherman Act of 1890. In addition, the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956 and the Bank Merger Act of 1960 include antitrust
provisions that speciﬁcally pertain to the activities of banking
organizations.
8. The proportion of domestic banking assets accounted for by the
100 largest banking organizations rose from just over 50 percent in
1980 to 70 percent in June 1998. Notably, however, small community
banks have generally been able to retain their market shares and
proﬁtability in competition in banking markets increasingly domi-
nated by the major banks (testimony by Governor Laurence H. Meyer
before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House
of Representatives, April 29, 1998).
Geographic Restrictions in Banking
Historically, the ability of banking institutions to merge
or to buy one another and to establish branch ofﬁces both
within and across local communities has been sharply
curtailed by federal and state laws limiting geographic
expansion by banks.1 Over the past two decades or so,
many of these laws have been changed or eliminated,
resulting in the easing of barriers to consolidation.
Before 1975 intrastate restrictions on bank branching
were commonplace. For example, only seventeen states
allowed commercial banks to establish ofﬁces within
their state with few or no geographic restrictions. Since
then, mainly in the 1980s, geographic restrictions on
intrastate branching have been removed or relaxed sub-
stantially in all states. The easing of these restrictions
allows banking organizations to expand their geographic
reach by establishing or acquiring branch ofﬁces rather
than by merging with, or acquiring, another banking
institution.
Geographic restrictions on banking extended beyond
branching limitations to restrictions on banking institu-
tions merging with, or acquiring, organizations in another
state. For example, until the 1970s, no state permitted
out-of-state commercial banking organizations to operate
in-state banking subsidiaries. State barriers began to fall
in 1978 when Maine relaxed restrictions on entry by
out-of-state holding companies. During the next ﬁfteen
years or so, every state except Hawaii followed suit by
allowing some degree of interstate banking.
The Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efﬁciency Act of 1994 further eased restrictions on inter-
state banking in two important ways. First, it allowed
bank holding companies to acquire a bank in any state
provided certain conditions were met, including compli-
ance with the CRA. Second, it substantially eased restric-
tions on interstate branching, although some important
restrictions continue to exist.
1. For a discussion of the various banking laws, see Avery, Bostic,
Calem, and Canner, ‘‘Changes in the Distribution of Banking Ofﬁces,’’
pp. 712–13 and Anthony W. Cyrnak, ‘‘Bank Merger Policy and the New
CRA Data,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 84 (September 1998),
pp. 703–15.
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LOWER-INCOME AND MINORITY BORROWERS
AND NEIGHBORHOODS
Access to home mortgage credit among lower-
income and minority borrowers and borrowers in
lower-income and minority neighborhoods may be
sensitive to changes caused by consolidation in the
banking industry. This view derives from two general
sets of arguments, which have potentially different
implications. On the one hand, decentralized (local)
decisionmaking may be especially important to a suc-
cessful lower-income lending program, and consoli-
dation may potentially reduce the role of local deci-
sionmaking. On the other hand, because lending to
lower-income and minority borrowers and neighbor-
hoods sometimes involves special considerations
of credit risk and often requires increased resources
for risk-management activities, such lending may
increase when consolidation improves the ability of
institutions to efﬁciently evaluate, monitor, and man-
age credit risk.
These potential effects can vary, depending on a
number of factors, such as whether the institutions to
be combined operate within the same local communi-
ties. Other factors include competitive interactions
among institutions, regulatory considerations, and the
diminished role of savings associations. Ultimately,
the effects of any given consolidation will depend on
how it is implemented and on the commitment and
ability of the management of the surviving institution
to helping meet the credit needs of all segments of its
community.
The Role of Local Decisionmaking
Successful home purchase lending to lower-income
and minority borrowers and neighborhoods often
requires considerable knowledge of the circum-
stances prevailing in local neighborhoods and exper-
tise in evaluating the credit risks associated with
such lending.9 Institutions active in such lending
frequently use ﬂexible credit standards, nontradi-
tional measures of credit quality, a variety of credit
enhancements (such as private and public subsidies
and guarantees), and intensive monitoring of out-
standing loans to expand their lending beyond those
borrowers who are eligible for more conventional
credit products. These institutions sometimes partici-
pate in local public agency programs in which the
public authority provides funds, in the form of either
grants or low-cost loans, to help meet the borrower’s
downpayment or closing costs, or sets up a fund to
guarantee repayment of the loan. These lenders also
work with community organizations to identify and
counsel prospective loan applicants and to monitor
borrower repayment performance.
Some believe that mergers and acquisitions may
have an adverse effect on lending to lower-income
and minority borrowers and neighborhoods when
they result in a transfer of decisionmaking to those
outside the local community. In this view, centralized
decisionmakers may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to accu-
rately assess nontraditional credit risks. They may
have less knowledge about economic conditions or
credit-risk factors speciﬁc to the local community, or
they may have less ﬂexibility in decisionmaking.
Such concerns tend to be heightened when a large
bank acquires a small bank, or when a bank is
acquired by an institution that had not previously
operated in the local market.10
A related concern is that mergers and acquisitions,
as well as failures, may lead to branch closings and
the loss of lending personnel who are familiar with
the needs of the local community. Real estate agents,
home builders, and those working for nonproﬁt
groups or community organizations often develop
working relationships with individual mortgage loan
ofﬁcers and may ﬁnd the disruption of such relation-
ships problematical.
Opportunities Created by Technology Transfer,
Information Sharing, and Risk Management
Although mergers and acquisitions may lead to dis-
ruptions and changes in business relationships, some
contend that consolidation often provides new oppor-
tunities to expand service to lower-income and
minority borrowers and neighborhoods. Beneﬁcial
effects may arise through a variety of channels. For
example, a small lender that becomes part of a larger
organization may be able to take advantage of new
technologies that reduce loan origination costs, such
as automated underwriting, thus potentially improv-
ing access to credit for consumers. More generally,
mergers and acquisitions may result in greater
efﬁciencies in underwriting, application processing,
and loan-servicing activities if scale economies can
be achieved or if the ﬁrm being acquired has been
9. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report
to the Congress on Community Development Lending by Depository
Institutions (Board of Governors, October 1993).
10. For discussion of the potential advantages of small banks, see
Leonard I. Nakamura, ‘‘Small Borrowers and the Survival of the
Small Bank,’’ Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Business Review
(November/December 1994), pp. 3–13.
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regulatory restrictions on geographic expansion may
permit mergers that enhance the efﬁciency of the
combined institutions, with the potential of making
available additional resources for lending. Each of
these efﬁciencies may increase an institution’s ability
to serve lower-income and minority borrowers and
neighborhoods.
Consolidation may generate a sufﬁcient volume of
activity or allow the pooling of information to enable
the development of certain types of expertise. For
instance, so-called informational returns-to-scale may
be present by which merging banks gain sufﬁcient
volume to become specialists in lending in lower-
income and minority communities, leading to greater
efﬁciencies and reduced costs for such lending.11
Another type of informational advantage may come
from a consolidation in which the parties are able
to pool mutually beneﬁcial information that would
otherwise remain private.12
As noted, effective lending to lower-income bor-
rowers often involves leveraging private- and public-
sector funds. Public programs are frequently complex
in their administration, and implementing such pro-
grams can require expenditures that smaller institu-
tions have difﬁculty absorbing.13 As a consequence,
new credit-related programs and other types of
public-sector resources that broaden access to credit
may become available to the customers of an
acquired bank that previously lacked sufﬁcient
resources to fully participate in these programs.
Diversiﬁcation of loan portfolios achieved through
consolidation can potentially play an important role
in fostering and sustaining a lending program tar-
geted to lower-income borrowers or communities.
Diversifying a portfolio by including loans from dif-
ferent geographic areas and different customer bases,
both within and across communities, can enable a
lender to achieve more predictable and stable earn-
ings. Portfolio diversiﬁcation may also enhance
opportunities to package loans for resale in the sec-
ondary market, thereby providing new avenues to
raise funds for additional lending. Moreover, consoli-
dation may enhance mortgage lending opportunities
if an institution facing capital constraints on addi-




Consolidation may affect the competitive interaction
among lending institutions in a market, with possible
implications for market performance. A reduction in
competition brought about by consolidation might
adversely affect the availability of credit or credit-
related services in a community, although such effects
might not disproportionately affect lower-income and
minority borrowers and neighborhoods. One scenario
in which lending to minority borrowers and minority
neighborhoods might be adversely affected, at least
in the short run, is a reduction in competitive pres-
sures that enables some lenders to engage in discrimi-
natory practices.14 More generally, if a reduction in
competition in a given market results in higher prices
or tighter credit standards, lower-income and minor-
ity borrowers may be disproportionately affected to
the extent that a larger proportion of such borrowers
are marginally qualiﬁed.
Consolidation may not only affect the behavior of
the parties involved but may also have implications
for other market participants. For instance, if the
parties to a merger curtail their lending to lower-
income and minority borrowers and neighborhoods,
then other banks in the market or new entrants may
view this as an opportunity to gain customers. This
expansion or entry by other institutions may offset
some or all of the reduction in lending by the merged
institution.15 Such offsets are also possible for failed
institutions: Many failed banks and savings asso-
ciations are acquired by healthy organizations or are
reopened by investors entering the banking business.
The Role of Regulation
One aspect of government regulation of banking
activity emphasizes encouraging the availability of
11. See Robert B. Avery, Patricia E. Beeson, and Mark S. Snider-
man, ‘‘Neighborhood Information and Mortgage Lending,’’ Journal of
Urban Economics (forthcoming).
12. See William W. Lang and Leonard I. Nakamura, ‘‘A Model of
Redlining,’’ Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 33 (1993), pp. 223–34.
13. See Report to the Congress on Community Development Lend-
ing by Depository Institutions.
14. The theory of prejudicial discrimination developed by Becker
suggests that lenders who enjoy market power may choose to sacriﬁce
proﬁts to engage in discriminatory practices. However, the theory also
suggests that under competitive conditions, prejudicial discrimination
cannot be sustained in the long run because capital will ﬂow to those
ﬁrms that forgo discrimination and consequently earn higher proﬁts.
See Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957).
15. Previous research ﬁnds evidence of offsetting responses by
other market participants. For example, the closure of branches by
merging institutions with overlapping branch networks is partly offset
by the opening of new branches by other institutions. See Avery,
Bostic, Calem, and Canner, ‘‘Changes in the Distribution of Banking
Ofﬁces.’’ Also, research on the effect of consolidation on small
business lending ﬁnds that non-merging banks collectively tend to
increase their supply of small business credit when mergers occur in
their markets. See Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell, ‘‘The Effects
of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions on Small Business Lending.’’
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neighborhoods. This policy is implemented in two
ways. First, regulators periodically review the record
of banking institutions in meeting their CRA and fair
lending obligations. Second, CRA performance is
also considered as part of the review of applications
for mergers and acquisitions involving banking
institutions.
All banking institutions are likely to be concerned
about their periodic CRA evaluations. Institutions
actively engaged in consolidation activity may be
particularly concerned because of the role such evalu-
ations play in the merger and acquisition approval
process. In considering applications for mergers and
acquisitions, regulators review the results of CRA
compliance examinations, material submitted by the
applicant, and comments from the public on the
institution’s performance. Poor CRA performance
records may result in the denial of an application or
delay of approval until the institution can demon-
strate a record of satisfactory performance.16 It should
be noted that home mortgage lending is only one of
many activities that are considered when evaluating
CRA performance. It is possible for an institution to
earn a good CRA rating and make no mortgage loans.
Institutions with poor CRA track records are more
likely to encounter broad-based substantive objec-
tions from the public when applying for approval of
mergers or acquisitions, although even merging insti-
tutions with strong records of CRA performance
sometimes encounter CRA-related protests. Such pro-
tests can result in adverse publicity and additional
costs because the institution must often prepare
extensive material to respond to them. To avoid
CRA-related protests, as well as for other reasons,
many banking institutions, particularly those likely to
be involved in consolidation, have sought to enhance
their records of serving their local communities by
entering into agreements with community organiza-
tions. These agreements often include commitments
by the institution to achieve targeted lending volumes
in lower-income communities. 17
Thus, for institutions active in mergers and acquisi-
tions, the CRA provides incentives to maintain an
aggressive program of lending to lower-income bor-
rowers and neighborhoods. The incentives created
by the CRA may contribute to a positive association
between consolidation activity and lending to lower-
income borrowers or to lower-income neighborhoods.
By statute, regulators must also consider the com-
petitive implications of proposed mergers and acqui-
sitions along with their potential effects on the ‘‘con-
venience and needs’’ of the communities involved.
Proposed consolidations that may have a substantial
adverse effect on competition in a market generally
are not approved unless there are countervailing con-
venience and needs considerations (such as the acqui-
sition of a failing bank by a healthy institution).
Often, proposed mergers or acquisitions that initially
raise serious anticompetitive issues are approved only
after the parties agree to sell (divest) banking ofﬁces
with deposits and assets to limit their increase in
market share. Thus, regulatory review of proposed
mergers and acquisitions mitigates the possibility that
consolidation may adversely affect competition and
credit availability in the local community.
Consolidations Involving Savings Associations
Many of the recent consolidations in banking have
involved the acquisition of savings associations by
commercial banks, a development that may affect
home purchase lending. Savings associations are
encouraged, through tax provisions and other incen-
tives, to hold the majority of their assets in home
mortgages and also face restrictions on the amount
of commercial lending they are permitted. Because
commercial banks do not have similar incentives
to extend mortgages and are not similarly restricted
in their non-mortgage lending, the share of total
assets devoted to mortgages may decline in the
wake of commercial bank acquisitions of savings
associations.
CONSOLIDATION AND MARKET-LEVEL
CHANGES IN MORTGAGE LENDING
Given the variety of possible theoretical effects of
consolidation on lending to lower-income and minor-
ity borrowers and neighborhoods, empirical analysis
can help provide a greater understanding of this
issue. We use a specially constructed database that
combines information on mergers, acquisitions, and
failures of banking institutions with data on the
location of banking ofﬁces, neighborhood economic
and demographic characteristics, and home purchase
lending activity in metropolitan areas. (See the appen-
dix for more details on the construction of the data-
base.) The analysis of these data provides informa-
tion on trends in lending patterns in geographic areas
16. See Grifﬁth L. Garwood and Dolores S. Smith, ‘‘The Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 79 (April 1993), pp. 251–67; and remarks by
Governor Edward M. Gramlich, ‘‘Examining Community Reinvest-
ment,’’ at Widener University, Chester, Pennsylvania, November 6,
1998.
17. See Alex Schwartz, ‘‘Bank Lending to Minority and Low-
Income Households and Neighborhoods: Do Community Reinvest-
ment Agreements Make a Difference?’’ Journal of Urban Affairs,
vol. 20, no. 3 (1998), pp. 269–301.
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information allows us to assess the degree to which
consolidation is associated with changes in home
purchase lending overall, as well as to lower-income
and minority borrowers and neighborhoods.
Analytic Framework
The unit of analysis for this research is the county.
The county represents a compromise between the
MSA and smaller geographic units, such as a ZIP
code or census tract. On the one hand, for some small
banking organizations, the CRA service area may be
smaller than a county. In addition, for some consoli-
dations a focus of concern may be the effects on an
area smaller than a county. On the other hand, for
large organizations CRA evaluations may be based
on their lending throughout an entire MSA. It should
be noted that more than half of the MSAs in the
United States are made up of only one county, and
thus for these MSAs, the distinction between the
county and the MSA makes no difference.
In a given county, we count the number of home
purchase loans extended overall and those extended
to lower-income and minority borrowers and neigh-
borhoods by all lenders. We compare counties that
had high levels of consolidation activity with those
that had little or no consolidation activity. Data limi-
tations force us to restrict the analysis to lending in
counties in metropolitan areas (see the appendix).
The analysis focuses on trends in home purchase
lending during two periods, 1993–95 and 1995–97.
We use three-year study periods because it may take
some time for the effects of a consolidation to inﬂu-
ence home purchase lending. For example, the inte-
gration of mortgage lending operations, including
the retraining of staff and coordination of mortgage
underwriting activities, may require considerable
effort and time. Too long a study period, however,
makes it difﬁcult to separate the effects of consolida-
tion from other factors that may inﬂuence home
purchase lending. Three-year study periods seem a
reasonable compromise between these two concerns.
Further, two periods are used because signiﬁcant
variation occurred in the overall patterns of home
purchase lending between 1993–95 and 1995–97.
Comparing and contrasting the observed relation-
ships in the two periods allow us to draw more
deﬁnitive conclusions about how consolidation inﬂu-
ences home purchase lending patterns.
Consolidations are deﬁned at the level of the
banking organization. Both institutional mergers and
holding company acquisitions are treated as consoli-
dations. Mergers among subsidiaries of the same
holding company, however, are not considered
consolidations. All structural changes involving a
banking organization over each three-year period
are treated as a single consolidation. Thus, a con-
solidation might involve multiple mergers and
acquisitions (see the appendix). To count as a con-
solidation in a given county, the consolidation must
have involved the acquisition of a banking institution
operating banking ofﬁces in that county. Counties
in which only the acquiring institution operated
banking ofﬁces are not considered to have had
consolidations.
Counties are categorized by their level of consoli-
dation activity. To determine this level, we calculate
the proportion of all home purchase loans in a county
in the ﬁrst year of each study period that was origi-
nated by banking organizations with a consolidation
in the county. Counties are grouped by this pro-
portion into three categories: (1) counties in which
no organizations were involved in a consolida-
tion; (2) counties in which the proportion of loans
extended by organizations involved in consolidation
was less than or equal to the median share of loans
extended by organizations involved in consolidation
for that period (counties with low consolidation activ-
ity); and (3) counties in which the proportion of
loans extended by organizations involved in consoli-
dation was greater than the median share of loans
extended by organizations involved in consolidation
for that period (counties with high consolidation
activity). For the latter two groups, the median share
is calculated using only those counties that had
consolidations.
Counties are further divided along a number of
other dimensions. To differentiate the effects of con-
solidation in markets of different sizes and growth
rates, counties are grouped by the number of resi-
dents in the county as of 1995 and by the change in
their populations over the 1993–95 period. In addi-
tion, because market structure may inﬂuence lend-
ing strategies, counties are grouped according to the
market concentration in the MSA in which the county
is located, which was measured by a Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman index (HHI) based on banking deposits in
the MSA.18 A threshold HHI value of 1800 is used
18. A Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index (HHI) based on banking depos-
its is a standard measure used to assess the competitiveness of banking
markets. The Federal Reserve Board includes thrift deposits at 50 per-
cent in calculating market HHI values for its bank merger analysis.
(For more details, see Anthony W. Cyrnak, ‘‘Bank Merger Policy and
the New CRA Data,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 84 (September
1998), pp. 703–15.) In this analysis, we include deposits by savings
associations at 100 percent in calculating HHI values for each MSA
because savings associations are active competitors in the home
mortgage lending market.
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value of more than 1800 as one signal that the con-
solidation may have anticompetitive effects in the
market.
General Patterns of Home Purchase Lending
Over the 1993–97 period, home purchase lending in
metropolitan areas expanded robustly, as a strong
economy and job market and relatively low interest
rates encouraged additional home buying (table 1).
Although lower-income and minority borrowers and
neighborhoods accounted for a moderate proportion
of home purchase loans each year, the amount of
lending to such groups increased at a faster rate than
that to other groups.19 For example, over 1993–97,
lending to lower-income borrowers increased about
31 percent (measured by the change in the number of
loans), while lending to higher-income borrowers
(those with incomes greater than 120 percent of
the median family income of the MSA where they
purchased a home) rose 18 percent (table 2, memo
item). Similarly, lending to minority borrowers
increased about 53 percent, while lending to nonmi-
nority borrowers increased 13 percent.
The substantial growth in lending to lower-income
and minority borrowers and neighborhoods in recent
years is the consequence of many factors. Besides the
bolstering of demand by the strong economy and job
market, relatively low interest rates on home loans
and relatively modest changes in home prices have
combined to improve the affordability of homebuy-
ing. Moreover, since the early 1990s, originators of
conventional home purchase loans have initiated a
wide variety of affordable home purchase lending
programs intended to beneﬁt lower-income and
minority borrowers and neighborhoods.20 Signiﬁcant
19. For additional information about these patterns, see the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council press release, August 6,
1998.
20. For more information see Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic,
Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner, ‘‘Credit Risk, Credit Scoring,
and the Performance of Home Mortgages,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin,
vol. 82 (July 1996), pp. 621–48.
1. Distribution of home purchase loans, by characteristic of borrower and neighborhood, 1993–97
Borrower or census
tract characteristic
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Borrower
Racial or ethnic group1
Minority .................... 380,002 16.1 483,781 19.0 495,815 20.3 556,229 20.0 582,816 20.7
Nonminority ................ 1,974,386 83.9 2,065,434 81.0 1,950,183 79.7 2,231,494 80.0 2,234,608 79.3
Total ..................... 2,354,388 100.0 2,549,215 100.0 2,445,998 100.0 2,787,723 100.0 2,817,424 100.0
Income
(percentage of MSA median) 2
Less than 50 ................ 156,639 6.6 190,523 7.4 159,126 6.4 200,401 7.1 213,763 7.4
50–79 ...................... 488,486 20.5 532,891 20.6 516,317 20.8 608,596 21.5 629,636 21.8
80–119 ..................... 722,877 30.3 773,162 30.0 744,231 30.0 838,997 29.7 836,960 29.0
120 or more ................ 1,020,915 42.7 1,084,337 42.0 1,058,458 42.7 1,178,732 41.7 1,205,063 41.8
Total ..................... 2,388,917 100.0 2,580,913 100.0 2,478,132 100.0 2,826,726 100.0 2,885,422 100.0
Neighborhood
(census tract)
Racial or ethnic composition
(minorities as a percentage
of population) 3
Less than 5 ................. 772,595 31.8 801,662 30.8 775,968 30.9 885,891 30.8 877,244 29.8
5–9 ......................... 530,333 21.9 556,054 21.3 528,118 21.0 609,897 21.2 625,635 21.2
10–19 ...................... 526,196 21.7 572,154 21.9 547,444 21.8 635,674 22.1 661,654 22.4
20–49 ...................... 414,706 17.1 463,051 17.8 447,381 17.8 515,328 17.9 536,525 18.2
50 or more .................. 183,119 7.5 213,886 8.2 214,635 8.5 233,508 8.1 247,469 8.4
Total ..................... 2,426,949 100.0 2,606,807 100.0 2,513,546 100.0 2,880,298 100.0 2,948,527 100.0
Income (median family)
(percentage of MSA median) 3
Less than 50 ................ 26,689 1.1 30,592 1.1 32,179 1.3 35,777 1.2 38,034 1.3
50–79 ...................... 227,706 9.4 255,575 9.8 266,002 10.6 294,069 10.2 301,398 10.2
80–119 ..................... 1,202,522 49.5 1,301,267 49.9 1,279,304 50.9 1,455,975 50.5 1,476,450 50.1
120 or more ................ 970,032 40.0 1,019,373 39.1 936,061 37.2 1,094,477 40.0 1,132,645 38.4
Total ..................... 2,426,949 100.0 2,606,807 100.0 2,513,546 100.0 2,880,298 100.0 2,948,527 100.0
All ......................... 2,430,844 2,609,469 2,515,906 2,882,921 2,951,583
Note. Includes only owner-occupied one- to four-family home purchase
loans extended for properties in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The
counties included are those that were in MSAs throughout the period. Thus, loan
counts will differ from ﬁgures published by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). Totals for the four borrower and neighborhood
categories differ because information regarding borrower race or ethnic status
and income or property location was not reported for all loans.
1. Loans to black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American and ‘‘other race’’ bor-
rowers are classiﬁed as minority loans.
2. MSA median family income is estimated for each year by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development.
3. Median family income and racial composition are derived from the 1990
Census of Population and Housing.
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recent years have also improved opportunities for
lower-income borrowers. For example, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) has reduced the
up-front mortgage insurance premium for FHA-
insured loans, raised the maximum loan amount
eligible for FHA backing, and increased underwriting
ﬂexibility.
The Effects of Consolidation
To analyze the effects of consolidation activity on
home purchase lending patterns, we track changes
in the number of home purchase loans originated
in counties sorted by their degree of consolidation
activity for each of the two study periods. In each
period nearly all home purchase loans were extended
in counties that had some consolidation activity
(table 3). Only about 5 percent of loans were origi-
nated in MSA counties with no consolidation activity
during the two study periods. Loan volumes were
similar in counties with low levels of consolidation
activity and in those with high levels. Because nearly
all home purchase loans in MSAs were originated in
counties with some level of consolidation, the most
useful comparison is between counties with relatively
low levels of consolidation activity and those with
relatively high levels. The noteworthy relationships
between consolidation and changes in lending are
those that are consistent across time periods and
robust when controls for other factors are considered.
We use multivariate regressions to help identify
such relationships, although these regressions are not
shown in this article.
Percentage changes in the number of home pur-
chase loans extended in a county are not signiﬁcantly
different in areas with high and those with low con-
solidation activity for both overall lending and across
the four borrower and neighborhood lending catego-
ries (table 3). There are only minor exceptions to this
result. In particular, for the 1993–95 period smaller
counties with high levels of consolidation have a
lower growth rate of home purchase loans—both
overall and for lower-income applicants—than
smaller counties with low levels of consolidation
activity.
Although growth rates do not generally differ by
the level of consolidation activity in a county, they
do differ between periods and across the lending
categories. For example, the growth in the number of
loans to minority borrowers is generally greater
than the growth in the number of loans to lower-
income borrowers. However, within any given bor-
rower or neighborhood category, there is little differ-
ence in the loan growth rate between counties with
low consolidation activity and those with high con-
solidation activity. This result also holds when coun-
ties are grouped by population, population growth
rate, and market concentration.
The failure to ﬁnd a consistent and robust relation-
ship between the level of banking consolidation and
changes in home purchase lending has two possible
explanations. Consolidating organizations may not
change their home purchase lending behavior. Alter-
natively, any changes in home purchase lending
activity by consolidating organizations may be offset
by other market participants. Home purchase lending
2. Change in home purchase lending, by characteristic





















Minority .............. 27.3 2.5 12.2 4.8 53.4
Nonminority .......... 4.6 -5.6 14.4 .1 13.2




Less than 50 .......... 21.6 -16.5 25.9 6.7 36.5
50–79 ................ 9.1 -3.1 17.9 3.5 28.9
80–119 ............... 7.0 -3.7 12.7 -.2 15.8
120 or more .......... 6.2 -2.4 11.4 2.2 18.0








Less than 5 ........... 3.8 -3.2 14.2 -1.0 13.5
5–9 ................... 4.8 -5.0 15.5 2.6 18.0
10–19 ................ 8.7 -4.3 16.1 4.1 25.7
20–49 ................ 11.7 -3.4 15.2 4.1 29.4
50 or more ............ 16.8 .4 8.8 6.0 35.1




Less than 50 .......... 14.6 5.2 11.2 6.3 42.5
50–79 ................ 12.2 4.1 10.6 2.5 32.4
80–119 ............... 8.2 -1.7 13.8 1.4 22.8
120 or more .......... 5.1 -8.2 16.9 3.5 16.8
Total ............... 7.4 -3.6 14.6 2.4 21.5
All ................... 7.3 -3.6 14.6 2.4 21.4
Note. Includes only owner-occupied one- to four-family home purchase
loans extended for properties in MSAs. The counties included are those that
were in MSAs throughout the period. Thus, loan counts will differ from figures
published by the FFIEC. Totals for the four borrower and neighborhood cate-
gories differ because information regarding borrower race or ethnic status and
income or property location was not reported for all loans.
1. Loans to black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American and ‘‘other race’’ bor-
rowers are classiﬁed as minority loans.
2. MSA median family income is estimated for each year by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development.
3. Median family income and racial composition are derived from the 1990
Census of Population and Housing.
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is relatively easy, a typical market has many lenders,
and a mature secondary market allows institutions to
readily sell loans they originate and to extend addi-
tional credit.
The analysis presented here does not provide a
complete picture of the effect of consolidation on
home purchase lending. For example, it does not
identify changes in prices or product offerings. Fur-
ther, it does not provide information about the behav-
ior of any individual lender or lender type. However,
the results strongly suggest that over the entire study
period the level of consolidation activity among
banking organizations in a county had little effect on
the growth of total home purchase lending or on the
growth of lending to any of the four borrower and
neighborhood categories.
CONSOLIDATION AND MORTGAGE LENDING
AT THE BANKING ORGANIZATION LEVEL
The results presented in the last section showed little
relationship between consolidation activity and
changes in home purchase lending in a county. The
two potential explanations offered characterized
changes in the behavior of consolidating organiza-
tions differently. In this section, we focus on these
differences by examining changes in the behavior
of consolidating banking organizations. Because the
CRA mandates a special responsibility for banking
organizations to serve the credit needs of residents of
those areas where they operate banking ofﬁces, we
distinguish between changes in their behavior in
counties where they had banking ofﬁces before the
21. The competitive nature of the market becomes apparent when
comparing HHI measures based on home purchase loans with HHI
measures based on deposits. The former are consistently lower than
the latter, and often by a substantial amount.









































Overall ......... 2,430,844 3 2,515,906 17 380,002 30 495,815 18 645,125 5 675,443 25
None ......... 116,023 15 155,886 10 9,744 44 15,203 3 33,425 16 44,909 21
Low .......... 1,120,439 4 1,030,464 17 193,798 27 172,853 18 285,155 5 285,285 25
High ......... 1,194,382 2 1,329,465 19 176,460 33 307,759 18 326,545 3 345,249 25
By county size 3
500,000 or less .. 1,204,576 3 1,243,745 14 111,916 35 150,557 16 334,858 3 343,915 23
None ......... 108,945 14 145,480 11 8,854 43 10,088 12 31,381 16 42,446 21
Low .......... 526,331 5 587,619 15 55,682 33 74,501 17 140,076 3 162,441 25
High ......... 569,300 0 510,646 13 47,380 34 65,968 15 163,401 0 139,028 22
More than
500,000 .... 1,226,268 4 1,272,161 21 268,086 29 345,258 18 310,267 7 331,528 27
None ......... 7,078 16 10,506 0 890 57 5,115 -16 2,044 19 2,463 22
Low .......... 594,108 3 442,845 19 138,116 25 98,352 18 145,079 7 122,844 26
High ......... 625,082 5 818,810 22 129,080 33 241,791 19 163,144 7 206,221 27
By county
growth rate 4
Low growth ..... 1,287,804 2 1,314,868 16 226,156 26 285,737 14 350,217 5 366,449 21
None ......... 55,055 10 89,039 7 5,377 39 11,474 -3 15,605 13 25,857 18
Low .......... 529,018 2 402,281 15 107,442 22 74,072 13 135,730 5 121,810 21
High ......... 703,731 2 823,548 17 113,337 29 200,191 15 198,882 4 218,782 22
High growth .... 1,143,040 5 1,201,038 19 153,846 37 210,078 22 294,908 5 308,994 29
None ......... 6,098 19 66,947 15 4,307 51 3,729 19 17,820 19 19,052 25
Low .......... 591,421 5 628,183 18 86,356 33 98,781 21 149,425 5 163,475 29
High ......... 490,651 3 505,908 21 63,123 40 107,568 24 127,663 2 126,467 31
By market
concentration 5
Less than 1800 .. 2,122,710 4 2,166,613 18 344,785 30 445,233 18 552,825 5 579,286 25
None ......... 93,065 16 109,407 12 7,851 46 7,631 11 27,276 17 32,584 23
Low .......... 1,028,222 3 845,191 17 179,838 28 143,724 17 260,159 5 234,545 25
High ......... 1,001,423 3 1,212,015 20 157,096 32 293,878 19 265,390 5 312,157 26
1800 and more .. 308,134 2 349,293 12 35,217 31 50,582 13 92,300 1 96,157 23
None ......... 22,958 8 46,579 7 1,893 36 7,572 -6 6,149 12 12,325 17
Low .......... 92,217 5 185,273 16 13,960 16 29,129 20 24,996 5 50,740 27
High ......... 192,959 1 117,441 8 19,364 42 13,881 8 61,155 -2 33,092 19
90 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1999consolidation and changes in their behavior in coun-
ties where they did not. Many banking organizations
do considerable lending in areas where they do not
have banking ofﬁces, often through afﬁliated mort-
gage and ﬁnance companies. In addition, institutions
that are not afﬁliated with banking organizations and
are not subject to the CRA—such as credit unions
and mortgage and ﬁnance companies—extend many
home purchase loans. Indeed, loans made by banking
organizations in counties in which they had banking
ofﬁces accounted for only 38 percent of overall home
purchase lending in 1993 (derived from table 4).
The pattern of lending by banking organizations
in counties where they operated banking ofﬁces is
different from that of banking organizations in areas
where they did not operate banking ofﬁces and from
that of lending by other institutions (table 4). For
example, over the 1993–97 period, banking organi-
zations increased their overall lending 69 percent in
areas where they did not have banking ofﬁces at the
beginning of the period but only 8 percent in those
counties where they did operate banking ofﬁces.
There are similar differences in growth rates for the
































Overall ......... 597,825 11 662,016 18 254,395 17 298,181 14
None ......... 19,014 23 22,629 5 11,635 30 18,017 7
Low .......... 335,192 7 247,737 15 115,026 12 116,831 13
High ......... 243,619 15 391,650 21 127,734 21 163,333 15
By county size 3
500,000 or less .. 185,540 12 207,501 12 114,231 15 131,010 10
None ......... 18,175 22 16,112 11 10,944 30 16,402 9
Low .......... 104,422 9 112,192 13 47,164 12 61,840 11
High ......... 62,943 13 79,197 10 56,123 14 52,768 8
More than
500,000 .... 412,285 10 454,515 22 140,164 19 167,171 17
None ......... 839 33 6,517 -10 691 35 1,615 -14
Low .......... 230,770 6 135,545 18 67,862 12 54,991 15
High ......... 180,676 16 312,453 24 71,611 26 110,565 19
By county
growth rate 4
Low growth ..... 335,403 9 366,124 18 154,804 17 181,657 12
None ......... 9,172 25 17,527 2 5,482 26 11,617 -1
Low .......... 177,090 5 99,726 13 61,569 13 54,931 10
High ......... 149,141 13 248,871 22 87,753 19 115,109 14
High growth .... 262,422 13 295,892 19 99,591 17 116,524 17
None ......... 7,842 21 5,102 15 6,153 33 6,400 22
Low .......... 158,102 9 148,011 17 53,457 11 61,900 15
High ......... 94,478 19 142,779 20 39,981 23 48,224 20
By market
concentration5
Less than 1800 .. 540,007 10 591,086 19 225,264 17 259,284 14
None ......... 15,474 22 11,137 11 9,861 31 12,571 12
Low .......... 312,379 7 203,546 15 106,089 11 95,015 11
High ......... 212,154 14 376,403 22 109,314 20 151,698 16
1800 and more .. 57,818 15 70,930 11 29,131 22 38,897 10
None ......... 3,540 27 11,492 -1 1,774 26 5,446 -2
Low .......... 22,813 3 44,191 16 8,937 22 21,816 18
High ......... 31,465 23 15,247 4 18,420 22 11,635 2
1. Loans for which the borrowers’ income was below 80 percent of the cur-
rent year median family income of their MSA were classiﬁed as loans to lower-
income borrowers. Loans to black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, and
‘‘other race’’ borrowers were classifed as loans to minorities.
Information on the census tract location of the property being purchased was
used to determine which loans were originated in lower-income or minority
neighborhoods. Loans for properties in census tracts whose 1990 median fam-
ily income was less than 80 percent of the 1990 median income of their MSA
were classiﬁed as loans to lower-income neighborhoods. Similarly, loans for
properties in census tracts with more than 20 percent minority residents in 1990
were classiﬁed as loans to minority neighborhoods.
2. The three categories of consolidation are deﬁned as the following:
None—counties in which no organizations were involved in a consolidation;
low—counties in which the share of loans extended by organizations involved
in consolidations was less than or equal to the median share of loans extended
in all counties by organizations involved in consolidations for that period; and
high—counties in which the share of loans extended by organizations involved
in consolidations was greater than the median share of loans extended in all
counties by organizations involved in consolidations for that period.
3. Population.
4. Counties with low growth rates are those where the 1993–95 growth in
population was less than the median for all counties in the study. Counties with
high growth rates are those where the growth in population was equal to or
greater than the median.
5. Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index (HHI) level based on deposits at the begin-
ning of each period.
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The unit of observation in measuring the effects of
consolidation in the analysis in this section is the
banking organization–county combination. Each
banking organization is linked with each county
in every metropolitan area—a total of 726 counties.
Thus, each banking organization potentially has
726 distinct observations. However, a banking
organization–county combination is included in the
sample only if the organization had a CRA obligation
in the county. Such an obligation is considered to
exist if any banking-institution component (commer-
cial bank or savings association) of a banking organi-
zation operated a banking ofﬁce in the county at the
beginning of the study period. A single organization
may appear in the sample several times if it had
ofﬁces in more than one county, as was true in 1993,
for instance, for nearly 30 percent of the banking
organizations (appendix table A.1). The sample was
further restricted to include only those combinations
in which the organization extended ten loans or more
in the county in the ﬁrst year of the analytical
period.22
To assess the effects of consolidation on home
purchase lending by banking organizations, we
compare the behavior of organizations that were
involved in consolidation in a county with that of
organizations that were not. As before, an organiza-
tion is considered to have undergone a consolidation
in a county only if a banking-institution component
of the organization that was operating a banking
ofﬁce in the county was acquired during the study
period. Those combinations involved in consolida-
tion are further subdivided according to the type
of consolidation. These decompositions allow for
an assessment of whether and how consolidation in
banking has been associated with changes in overall
lending and lending to lower-income and minority
borrowers and neighborhoods. Because economic
theory suggests that the geographic proximity of the
acquiring and acquired organizations may inﬂuence
subsequent lending patterns, we divide organization–
county combinations involved in consolidation into
three types according to the location of the ofﬁces of
the acquiring component: (1) consolidations in which
the acquiring as well as the acquired components
of the organizations operated ofﬁces in the county
(within-county consolidations), (2) consolidations in
which the acquiring component operated an ofﬁce
in the MSA containing the county but not in the
county (within-MSA-not-in-county consolidations),
and (3) consolidations in which the acquiring compo-
nent did not operate ofﬁces in either the county or its
MSA (out-of-MSA consolidations).
Economic theory further suggests that the size of
the organizations involved in a consolidation may
affect lending activity. Thus, for the current analysis,
we group consolidations according to the size (in
assets) of the acquiring and the acquired organization
(see the appendix): (1) a small organization (assets of
less than $250 million) acquiring another small orga-
nization, (2) a medium-sized organization (assets
between $250 million and $10 billion) acquiring a
small organization, (3) a medium-sized organization
acquiring another medium-sized organization, (4) a
large organization (assets greater than $10 billion)
acquiring a small organization, (5) a large organi-
zation acquiring a medium-sized organization, and
22. This restriction removes only about 1 percent of the home
purchase loans from the sample.




Type of borrower1 Type of neighborhood1





















Banking organizations ....... 1,459,878 31 208,178 63 402,724 27 315,803 40 151,768 32
In counties with
branch ofﬁces2 ....... 925,236 8 131,739 29 259,676 4 193,251 15 104,356 4
In other counties .......... 534,642 69 76,439 122 143,048 68 122,552 79 47,322 93
Other institutions 3 ........... 970,966 8 171,824 42 242,401 37 282,022 21 102,717 36
All lenders ................. 2,430,844 21 380,002 53 645,125 31 597,825 31 254,395 33
Note. Includes only owner-occupied one- to four-family home purchase
loans extended in MSAs.
1. See note 1 to table 3.
2. Category includes loans by all commercial banks, savings associa-
tions, and their mortgage and ﬁnance company afﬁliates. Banking organiza-
tions are considered to have a branch ofﬁce in a county only where the com-
mercial bank or savings association component of the organization has a branch
ofﬁce in that county.
3. Category includes independent mortgage and ﬁnance companies and credit
unions.
92 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1999(6) a large organization acquiring another large
organization.
The approach taken here employs performance
standards often used in previous research on home
mortgage lending issues.23 They are also used in
evaluating the CRA record of banking organizations.
These measures are (1) the change in the number of
loans an organization makes in a county overall and
to lower-income and minority borrowers and neigh-
borhoods, (2) changes in an organization’s share of
the total number of loans in a county overall and to
lower-income and minority borrowers and neighbor-
hoods in each of the organization’s local communi-
ties (market share), and (3) changes in the share of an
organization’s own loan activity in a county that
is composed of such lending (portfolio share). (See
box ’’Performance Standards Used to Measure the
Effects of Consolidation at the Organization Level.’’)
All three measures are based on numbers of loans,
although CRA examiners also consider the dollar
amount of lending in using these measures. Changes
in the lending activity of consolidating organizations
are computed by comparing lending by the merged
organization at the end of the period with the com-
bined lending activity of the component parts of the
merged organization (called a ‘‘pro forma’’ organiza-
tion) at the beginning of the period.24
Because we want to characterize the behavior of
the ‘‘typical’’ banking organization, we focus on
median values in the market share and portfolio share
analyses. The median is preferred because the
mean may be greatly inﬂuenced by extreme values,
either positive or negative. Median values are
sensitive, however, to the number of banking
organization–county combinations that had no lend-
ing in a particular borrower or neighborhood cate-
gory over the analytical period. For some categories,
the number of such combinations is relatively large,
which can give a misleading indication of the effects
of consolidation on organizations active in certain
types of lending (table 5).25 Thus, in calculating
median values, we exclude all cases in which a
banking organization extended no loans in a particu-
lar borrower or neighborhood category in a county.
For example, if a bank extended no loans to lower-
23. See, for example, Glenn B. Canner, Wayne Passmore, and
Brian J. Surette, ‘‘Distribution of Credit Risk among Providers of
Mortgages to Lower-Income and Minority Homebuyers,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 82 (December 1996), pp. 1077–1102.
24. The sum includes all lending in the county by all component
parts of the organization in the ﬁrst period, including those compo-
nents that did not have banking ofﬁces or CRA obligations.
25. For example, in each of the sample periods about 27 percent
of the banking organization–county combinations had no lending to
minority neighborhoods. This result likely reﬂects a relatively large
number of smaller banks located in counties with small numbers of
minority neighborhoods.
Performance Standards Used to Measure
the Effects of Consolidation
at the Organization Level
Three performance standards are used to measure the
effects of consolidation: the number of home purchase
loans, market share, and portfolio share. Three measures
are used because, while each may provide insight into
home purchase lending in a market, each also has some
shortcomings. In combination, they provide a more com-
plete picture of trends in lending.
The number of home purchase loans an organization
makes is one indicator of the level of service it provides
to a local area. Changes in this measure show whether
lending is increasing or decreasing. However, exclusive
consideration of this measure may lead to misleading
inferences. The number of loans does not provide an
indication of how well an organization is performing
relative to other organizations in a given market. It also
fails to show an organization’s own relative commitment
to certain types of lending.
The second measure, market share, addresses the ﬁrst
of these limitations. Changes in an organization’s market
share of home purchase loans provide a measure of how
its activity is changing relative to the market as a whole.
Increases (decreases) in market share indicate that an
organization has a greater (lesser) presence in a given
type of lending. Trends in market share do not necessar-
ily mirror trends in the number of loans. For example, an
organization’s market share can decline even while the
number of its loans increases if other organizations
increase their levels of lending more rapidly. The market
share measure, however, is not without its own limita-
tions as a measure of performance. Most prominently, an
organization’s market share may be greatly inﬂuenced
by the actions of other competitors in the market and
changes in the demand for home purchase loans, both of
which are largely outside its control.
The portfolio share measure provides another gauge of
an organization’s relative experience with a given type of
lending. Like the market share measure, trends in port-
folio share can be different from trends in the number
of loans. However, unlike the market share measure, the
portfolio share measure tends not to be overly sensitive to
the activities of market competitors. The limitation of
this measure is that an organization may have a growing
portfolio share of lending to a given population yet a
shrinking presence overall in lending to that population,
measured either in terms of absolute numbers of loans or
market share.
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ered in calculating the median change in market share
of lending to lower-income borrowers during that
period (that is, it is not considered to have had a
0 percent change in its market share).26
It is important to emphasize that the patterns found
in this analysis may differ from those in the previous
section. In this analysis, we track changes in home
purchase lending for banking organizations only in
the counties in which they operated ofﬁces at the
beginning of each analytical period. These changes
do not necessarily reﬂect total changes in an orga-
nization’s lending, as an organization may have
expanded both its CRA obligations and its lending
into new markets over time. As with the preceding
analysis, the discussion emphasizes only those rela-
tionships that are robust after considering other fac-




in Counties Where They Operate Ofﬁces
A simple count of the number of banking
organization–county combinations involved in con-
solidation provides a perspective on the extent
of consolidation in the banking industry over our
periods of analysis. Over each time period we
analyze, a relatively small percentage of banking
organization–county combinations were involved in
consolidation—for example, only 18 percent of the
organization–county combinations in the sample over
the 1995–97 period were involved in a consolidation
(table 6). However, these tended to include organiza-
tions with relatively large numbers of home purchase
loans, as they accounted for almost 30 percent of all
lending in counties by banking organizations with
CRA obligations in those counties (derived from
table 7).
Most banking organization–county combinations
involved in consolidation were involved in
either within-county consolidations or out-of-MSA
consolidations—90 percent over 1993–95 (derived
from table 6). In addition, a majority of the banking
organization–county combinations involved in merg-
ers involved large acquiring institutions—54 percent
over 1993–95 (derived from table 6). These organiza-
tions extended most of the home purchase loans—
26. While this procedure reduces the sample, it does not result in a
signiﬁcant decline in the number of banking organization–county
combinations involved in consolidation that were included in the
sample. Very few organizations that had no lending in either period
were involved in a consolidation. For example, over 1995–97, less
than 1 percent of all banking organization–county combinations in the
sample that were involved in consolidation made no loans to minority
borrowers or to lower-income borrowers.
5. Percentage of banking organization–county combinations with no lending to minority and lower-income borrowers
and neighborhoods, 1993–95 and 1995–97
Category
Type of borrower1 Type of neighborhood1
Minority Lower-income Minority Lower-income
1993–95 1995–97 1993–95 1995–97 1993–95 1995–97 1993–95 1995–97
No lending .................................. 10.6 9.7 .4 .5 27.1 27.5 14.8 15.6
No lending and involved in consolidations .... 1.0 .8 .1 .1 4.2 3.4 2.1 2.0
Memo
Number of banking organization–
county combinations .................... 7,143 7,100 7,143 7,100 7,143 7,100 7,143 7,100
1. See note 1 to table 3.
6. Distribution of banking organization–county
combinations, by level of consolidation activity







No consolidation .................. 5,850 5,800
By size of banking organization1
Small .......................... 2,047 1,813
Medium ....................... 2,237 2,168
Large .......................... 1,566 1,819
Any consolidation ................ 1,293 1,300
By location
Within county .................. 603 608
Within MSA, not in county ..... 125 96
OutofMSA ................... 565 596
By size of banking organization1
Small acquiring small ........... 78 69
Medium acquiring small ........ 211 184
Medium acquiring medium ..... 300 197
Large acquiring small ........... 71 51
Large acquiring medium ........ 314 318
Large acquiring large ........... 319 481
All banking organization–
county combinations ........ 7,143 7,100
1. Size categories are the following: A small organization has assets of
less than $250 million; a medium-sized organization has assets between
$250 million and $10 billion; and a large organization has assets of more than
$10 billion.
94 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1999about 68 percent over 1993–95—originated by bank-
ing organization–county combinations involved in
consolidation (derived from table 7).
Changes in the Level and Market Share
of Home Purchase Lending
In stark contrast to the analysis of the effects of
consolidation on home purchase lending at the mar-
ket level, which found no consistent relationships
between consolidation and changes in home purchase
lending, consolidation does appear to be related to
changes in home purchase lending when the effects
are examined at the organizational level. Again
the focus is on lending by banking organizations
in those counties in which they operated banking
ofﬁces.
Banking organization–county combinations that
were involved in consolidation consistently showed
less growth (or more decline) in the number of
home purchase loans they originated than banking
organization–county combinations that were not
involved in consolidation. Moreover, the growth in
home purchase lending by both groups was generally
less than the growth in total lending in metropolitan
areas. Although the growth rates of total lending for
all mortgage lending organizations were 3 percent
and 17 percent in 1993–95 and 1995–97 respectively
(derived from table 1), the number of loans extended
by the banking organization–county combinations in
our sample that were involved in consolidation
declined about 14 percent in each period while the
number of loans extended by those combinations in
our sample not involved in consolidation increased
3 percent in both periods (table 7).
These relative relationships generally hold for
overall lending and for lending to the four borrower
and neighborhood categories and in both time
periods, although not all differences are statistically
signiﬁcant. The market share of home purchase loans
in a county extended by the typical consolidating
organization with an ofﬁce in that county (that is, the
median banking organization–county combination
involved in a consolidation) declined substantially
in both years, and by more than that of the typical
non-consolidating organization with an ofﬁce in that
county (table 8). This result indicates that the patterns
shown in table 7 are not driven by the behavior of
just a few large organizations but rather reﬂect the
experiences of the typical organization.
When banking organization–county combinations
involved in a consolidation are distributed accord-
ing to the type of consolidation that took place,
few consistent patterns appear, with two notable
exceptions. Grouping banking organization–county
combinations according to the location of ofﬁces of
the acquiring ﬁrm, we ﬁnd that within-county con-
solidations are associated with larger growth (or
smaller declines) in the number of loans extended
overall and to the four borrower and neighborhood
categories compared with other types of consoli-
dation (table 7). For example, although the overall
amount of lending by banking organization–county
combinations involved in out-of-MSA consolidations
declined 27 percent over 1993–95, the decline was
only 9 percent among those combinations involved in
within-county consolidations.
Banking organization–county combinations are
also grouped according to the size of the acquiring
and acquired organizations. The most consistent
results occur among those consolidations in which
the acquirer was large, although the differences were
not always statistically signiﬁcant. Acquisitions of
small organizations by large organizations generally
are associated with the largest increases in the num-
ber of loans extended overall and to the four bor-
rower and neighborhood groups. Acquisitions of
large organizations by other large organizations gen-
erally are associated with relatively large declines in
lending.
The ﬁnding that consolidation is consistently asso-
ciated with declines in lending—both overall and
across the four borrower and neighborhood groups—
appears to support the view that consolidation
results in a reduction in home purchase lending,
possibly because of a shift away from local decision-
making, anticompetitive effects, or the acquisition
of savings associations by banking organizations.
However, some results are inconsistent with these
explanations.
A reduction of the inﬂuence of local decisionmak-
ing would suggest that consolidations in which a
large organization acquires a small organization
might be associated with larger declines (or less
growth) in lending than consolidations in which both
the acquirer and acquired organization are large.
However the reverse is true—consolidations in
which large organizations acquired other large
organizations are generally associated with larger
declines (or less growth) than consolidations in which
largeorganizationsacquiredsmallorganizations.Anti-
competitive effects would most likely be observed
in within-county consolidations; yet these are not
associated with a disproportionate decline in lending.
It should be noted, however, that the ﬁnding that out-
of-MSA consolidations show the largest declines
in lending is consistent with a shift away from local
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ing the acquisition of savings associations by banking
organizations, which, as noted earlier, could poten-
tially reduce home purchase lending, show virtually
the same lending patterns as other consolidations.
Also, these results cannot readily be explained by
a reduction in overall lending by organizations that
were involved in consolidation. Overall home pur-
chase lending by these organizations grew 16 percent
in 1993–95 and 22 percent during 1995–97 (not
shown in tables). Virtually all of this growth was in
counties in which the organizations did not have
banking ofﬁces. The growth in these institutions’
home purchase lending in these out-of-market areas
was 57 percent over 1993–95 and 69 percent over
1995–97 (not shown in tables). Moreover, the growth
in out-of-market lending by these consolidating bank-
ing organizations substantially exceeded the growth
in home purchase lending by other groups of market
participants.
The reduction of home purchase lending by con-
solidating banking organizations in those counties in
which they operated ofﬁces appears to be part of an
overall trend toward geographic diversiﬁcation. This
diversiﬁcation may have been fueled by the acquisi-
tion of large, previously independent mortgage bank-
ing organizations and an expansion of activity by
previously afﬁliated mortgage and ﬁnance compa-
nies. Also, increased standardization in the home
purchase loan market, facilitated in part by develop-
ments in the secondary market and the growing use
of automated underwriting, may have reduced the
need for banking organizations to maintain a local
presence to originate home purchase loans.
Changes in Portfolio Shares
Results using the portfolio share measure provide a
different picture of the effect of consolidation on
home purchase lending than those using either mar-
ket share measures or counts of loans (table 9). Using
market share measures or counts of loans showed that
organizations involved in consolidation typically
reduced their overall lending and lending to the four
borrower and neighborhood groups in those counties
in which they had banking ofﬁces. The portfolio
7. Home purchase loans by banking organization–county combinations, by level of consolidation activity



































No consolidation . 653,665 3 692,296 3 92,299 26 115,623 -2 181,881 -2 190,323 1
By size 2
Small ........ 114,177 -7 90,406 7 12,151 11 11,383 11 30,923 -6 24,961 14
Medium ...... 264,289 2 244,983 9 32,038 28 33,624 4 71,006 -1 62,541 11
Large ........ 275,199 7 356,907 -2 48,110 29 70,616 -8 79,952 -2 102,821 -9
Any consolidation . 278,519 -15 289,948 -13 39,072 12 58,430 -11 78,589 -13 73,963 -6
By location
Within county . 182,301 -9 188,107 -8 27,898 15 43,315 -8 50,613 -8 46,706 0
Within MSA,
not in
county ... 10,949 -17 8,295 -23 926 66 1,358 -34 3,591 -8 2,221 -20




small .... 4,717 -19 5,206 -17 882 -43 729 -21 1,215 -20 1,472 -10
Medium
acquiring
small .... 24,513 -1 19,983 -7 3,119 31 3,509 -1 6,351 7 5,268 6
Medium
acquiring
medium .. 59,931 1 35,870 -17 6,543 20 5,268 -21 15,092 -1 9,389 -9
Large
acquiring
small .... 22,769 22 14,149 5 4,770 45 2,442 -3 6,549 8 4,424 7
Large
acquiring
medium .. 93,172 -27 84,569 -8 14,370 -5 16,873 -6 26,366 -26 22,321 -1
Large
acquiring
large ..... 73,417 -29 130,171 -18 9,388 17 29,609 -14 23,016 -17 31,089 -13
96 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1999share measure shows that this reduction did not dis-
proportionately affect lending to lower-income and
minority borrowers and neighborhoods. Indeed, the
portfolio share measure shows that the typical con-
solidating organization generally increased the pro-
portion of loans extended to each of the four bor-
rower and neighborhood groups. These changes are
generally larger (or less negative) than the changes
observed among banking organization–county com-
binations not involved in consolidation. For example,
the change in the portfolio share for lending to minor-
ity borrowers for the typical organization involved
in a consolidation was 31 percent compared with
only 21 percent for the typical organization not
involved in a consolidation during 1993–95. When
banking organization–county combinations involved
in consolidation are distributed according to the type
of consolidation (by either location or size of the
acquiring and acquired organization), few consistent
patterns emerge over the two periods.
These results are consistent with the view that the
CRA has been effective in encouraging banking orga-
nizations, particularly those involved in consolida-
tion, to serve lower-income and minority borrowers
and neighborhoods. The data, however, are not sufﬁ-
cient to provide a complete evaluation of the effects
of the CRA in this regard. For example, no informa-
tion is available on the prices charged for loans or on
whether they were underwritten using special guide-
lines for affordable lending programs. Loans to
lower-income and minority borrowers and neighbor-
hoods may be more difﬁcult to underwrite and thus
beneﬁt more from a local ofﬁce presence than from
any particular pressures due to the CRA. Moreover,
banking organizations have also increased their lend-
ing to lower-income and minority borrowers in coun-
ties where they have no banking ofﬁces.
APPENDIX:C ONSTRUCTION OF THE DATABASE
The data used in this article combine information on
branch ofﬁce location, home purchase loan origina-
tions, and records of bank structure, failures, merg-
ers, and acquisitions from several sources. (See



























No consolidation . 137,940 9 148,093 0 73,411 9 84,082 -10
By size 2
Small ......... 20,995 -6 16,260 8 12,985 0 11,237 2
Medium ...... 46,076 9 41,892 4 26,081 14 26,162 -3
Large ......... 70,869 14 89,941 -3 34,345 9 46,683 -17
Any consolidation . 54,650 -4 74,072 -9 30,379 0 33,626 -13
By location
Within county . 36,945 2 54,771 -6 19,902 5 22,961 -8
Within MSA,
not in
county ... 1,220 26 1,766 -27 1,319 20 999 -27




small ..... 1,305 -49 1,237 -35 617 -19 652 -29
Medium
acquiring
small ..... 4,307 8 5,373 -10 2,524 10 2,319 -7
Medium
acquiring
medium .. 9,840 -3 6,045 -23 5,736 2 3,826 -15
Large
acquiring
small ..... 6,994 29 2,845 3 3,149 16 1,903 7
Large
acquiring
medium .. 20,685 -13 20,872 -8 9,562 -9 8,977 -10
Large
acquiring
large ..... 11,519 -6 37,700 -7 8,791 1 15,949 -18
1. See note 1 to table 3. 2. See note 1 to table 6.
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No consolidation . 2.0 -7 2.2 -13 1.1 -9 1.3 -17 1.9 -13 2.0 -16
By size 2
Small ........ 1.2 -16 1.1 -11 .3 -21 .3 -16 1.2 -19 1.1 -12
Medium ...... 2.0 -4 1.9 -5 1.2 -3 1.2 -7 1.9 -8 1.7 -9
Large ........ 3.0 -1 3.6 -22 2.7 -4 3.3 -26 3.3 -10 3.5 -28
Any consolidation . 3.5 -24 3.6 -27 2.6 -19 3.0 -30 3.5 -24 3.4 -28
By location
Within county . 4.4 -17 4.3 -27 3.6 -13 3.8 -28 4.1 -14 4.1 -26
Within MSA,
not in
county ... 2.5 -34 2.8 -36 .7 -16 2.0 -48 2.9 -33 2.6 -36




small .... .7 -21 .9 -33 .2 -24 0.5 -36 .8 -21 .9 -37
Medium
acquiring
small .... 2.1 -15 1.7 -21 1.3 -12 .8 -18 2.1 -7 1.4 -15
Medium
acquiring
medium .. 3.4 -13 3.0 -30 2.2 -7 2.1 -31 3.1 -6 2.6 -28
Large
acquiring
small .... 3.8 -4 2.5 -18 4.3 -3 1.7 -20 4.1 -14 1.9 -25
Large
acquiring
medium .. 4.4 -30 5.1 -20 3.3 -29 4.4 -20 4.1 -33 5.0 -19
Large
acquiring
large ..... 4.9 -37 4.1 -32 4.0 -29 4.0 -37 4.5 -31 3.9 -34
9. Portfolio share of home purchase lending by banking organization–county combinations to minority and lower-income

























No consolidation .................... 6.3 21 7.5 -6 26.2 -5 26.2 5
By size 2
Small ............................ 3.4 20 4.3 -6 27.4 -3 28.0 5
Medium .......................... 6.3 25 7.5 -6 24.8 -5 24.2 6
Large ............................ 9.7 19 10.6 -6 26.7 -6 26.7 2
Any consolidation ................... 7.2 31 11.1 -5 26.1 3 25.0 8
By location
Within county .................... 8.3 28 13.9 -3 26.7 4 23.5 8
Within MSA, not in county ........ 4.4 45 8.8 -33 26.1 4 25.0 9
OutofMSA ...................... 6.9 31 9.2 -6 25.4 1 26.0 8
By size 2
Small acquiring small ............. 4.6 24 8.1 7 25.5 0 27.8 4
Medium acquiring small ........... 6.7 26 9.1 0 26.0 6 24.6 11
Medium acquiring medium ........ 7.3 28 7.8 -2 23.1 -1 24.1 10
Large acquiring small ............. 9.5 28 13.3 -7 24.2 -17 26.7 -7
Large acquiring medium .......... 8.1 31 11.7 -3 27.9 1 24.6 10
Large acquiring large ............. 7.2 38 13.8 -10 28.1 10 25.0 7


























No consolidation . 1.0 -10 1.1 -14 1.5 -11 1.5 -17
By size 2
Small ......... 0.3 -21 .3 -14 .7 -23 .6 -12
Medium ...... 1.1 -5. 9- 5 1.4 -5 1.3 -8
Large ......... 2.5 -4 2.9 -22 2.8 -7 3.3 -26
Any consolidation . 2.1 -20 3.0 -27 2.9 -24 3.0 -32
By location
Within county . 3.1 -11 3.4 -27 3.7 -11 3.8 -30
Within MSA,
not in
county ... .7 -15 2.0 -38 1.5 -20 2.1 -37




small ..... .2 -37 .6 -56 .4 -40 .8 -50
Medium
acquiring
small ..... 1.2 -18 .9 -19 1.9 -16 1.3 -16
Medium
acquiring
medium .. 2.0 -13 1.6 -36 2.4 -16 2.5 -36
Large
acquiring
small ..... 2.1 1 1.7 -17 3.6 5 2.1 -25
Large
acquiring
medium .. 2.9 -25 4.1 -19 3.8 -28 4.4 -22
Large
acquiring
large ..... 3.5 -24 3.8 -31 3.9 -29 3.6 -37
Note. Data are the initial median market share for each category of banking
organization–county combination and the median change in market share for each
period.
1. See note 1 to table 3.



























No consolidation .................... 7.3 2 6.7 -5 7.1 4 7.7 -8
By size 2
Small ............................ 2.6 0 2.0 -6 6.4 1 6.7 -8
Medium .......................... 7.9 4 6.7 -4 6.8 6 7.0 -9
Large ............................ 12.1 2 10.7 -5 8.7 6 9.0 -7
Any consolidation ................... 7.9 7 12.2 -2 7.5 11 8.5 -7
By location
Within county .................... 9.2 9 17.7 -3 7.4 12 9.5 -6
Within MSA, not in county ........ 2.3 22 8.9 -9 6.3 21 6.7 -9
OutofMSA ...................... 8.1 3 9.8 0 7.9 8 7.5 -7
By size 2
Small acquiring small ............. 5.7 -1 9.1 -21 6.8 -6 8.0 -10
Medium acquiring small ........... 10.4 9 13.5 0 6.9 9 7.2 -6
Medium acquiring medium ........ 8.8 3 7.3 0 6.8 2 8.0 -2
Large acquiring small ............. 16.1 0 16.0 1 8.7 -1 9.1 19
Large acquiring medium .......... 8.8 10 14.5 -3 8.0 18 9.1 -9
Large acquiring large ............. 6.2 14 13.6 -3 8.3 25 8.6 -9
Note. Data are the initial median portfolio share for each category of banking
organization–county combination and the median change in share for each period.
1. See note 1 to table 3
2. See note 1 to table 6.
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depository ofﬁces (banking ofﬁces) was extracted
from the annual Summary of Deposits ﬁlings for
commercial banks and Branch Ofﬁce Survey System
ﬁlings for savings associations for the years 1993
through 1997. The ofﬁce list includes all locations
qualifying as separate institution deposit-taking
ofﬁces under federal guidelines as of June 30 of each
year. It does not necessarily include all ‘‘drive-ins,’’
ATMs, or loan production ofﬁces; however, virtually
all ofﬁces whose presence implies a CRA obligation
are reported. Reporting banking institutions include
all federally insured commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, cooperative banks, and mutual sav-
ings banks, as deﬁned by the Federal Reserve Board’s
National Information Center (NIC) database. The
locations used for this study may differ slightly from
those used elsewhere because of some limited data
cleaning required for the analysis. For example, some
ofﬁces were added for a few institutions that did
not submit a Summary of Deposits or Branch Ofﬁce
Survey System ﬁling, and some addresses were
corrected for a limited number of ofﬁces for which
incorrect county location was reported.
Information on home purchase loan originations
used in the analysis was obtained from individual
mortgage loan data ﬁled under the 1989 amendments
to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
Each year, nearly all commercial banks, savings and
loan associations, credit unions, and other mortgage
lending institutions (primarily mortgage banks) with
assets of more than $10 million (raised to $29 million
in 1997) and an ofﬁce in an MSA are required to
report on each mortgage loan purchased and on each
loan application related to a one- to four-unit resi-
dence acted upon during the calendar year. Lenders
must report the loan amount, state, county, and cen-
sus tract of the property, whether the property would
be owner occupied, purpose of the loan, type of loan
(conventional, FHA, or VA), application disposition
(loan originated, application withdrawn, or applica-
tion denied), race and gender of the loan applicant,
and the applicant income relied on by the lending
institution in making the loan decision.27 For this
27. See Glenn B. Canner and Dolores S. Smith, ‘‘Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 77 (November 1991), pp. 859–81, for a compre-
hensive discussion of the HMDA data. It is estimated that 80 percent
to 87 percent of all home purchase loans were reported under HMDA
for the 1993–97 period. The FFIEC makes the HMDA data available
in various formats, including paper summaries, magnetic tape,
PC diskette, CD-ROM, and at the FFIEC web site (www.fﬁec.gov).
An order form for the HMDA data may be obtained by calling the
FFIEC at (202) 634-6526 or by downloading the form from the FFIEC
web site.
A.1. Distribution of MSA counties per banking organization and depository ofﬁces and home purchase loans
per organization–county combination, 1993, 1995, and 1997
Item
1993 1995 1997
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Number of MSA counties with branch ofﬁces
per organization
1 ........................................... 3,923 71.4 3,423 69.4 3,124 67.2
2 ........................................... 843 15.3 832 16.9 836 18.0
3 ........................................... 291 5.3 264 5.4 268 5.8
4–5 ......................................... 194 3.5 187 3.8 197 4.2
6–9 ......................................... 100 1.8 93 1.9 96 2.1
10–19 ...................................... 79 1.4 69 1.4 54 1.2
20–49 ...................................... 55 1.0 47 1.0 49 1.0
50 or more .................................. 13 .2 17 .3 22 .5
Total ..................................... 5,498 100.0 4,932 100.0 4,646 100.0
Depository ofﬁces per organization–
county combination
1 ........................................... 4,216 35.9 3,781 34.1 3,764 34.0
2 ........................................... 2,124 18.1 1,980 17.9 1,962 17.7
3 ........................................... 1,316 11.2 1,296 11.7 1,235 11.1
4–5 ......................................... 1,472 12.5 1,426 12.9 1,441 13.0
6–9 ......................................... 1,273 10.8 1,258 11.4 1,277 11.5
10 or more .................................. 1,338 11.4 1,339 12.1 1,394 12.6
Total ..................................... 11,739 100.0 11,080 100.0 11,073 100.0
Home purchase loans per organization–
county combination
0 ........................................... 1,336 11.4 1,026 9.3 1,476 13.3
1–9 ......................................... 2,894 24.7 2,494 22.5 2,277 20.6
10–19 ...................................... 1,471 12.5 1,430 12.0 1,292 11.7
20–49 ...................................... 2,142 18.2 2,091 18.9 2,065 18.7
50–99 ...................................... 1,531 13.0 1,581 14.3 1,507 13.6
100–499 .................................... 2,064 17.6 2,144 19.4 2,102 19.0
500 or more ................................ 301 2.6 314 2.8 354 3.2
Total ..................................... 11,739 100.0 11,080 100.0 11,073 100.0
100 Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1999study, the sample was restricted to loans originated
for the purchase of owner-occupied units. The sample
includes both conventional loans and loans backed by
government guarantees.
Information on the census tract location of the
property being purchased was used to determine
which loans were originated in lower-income or
minority neighborhoods. Loans for properties in cen-
sus tracts whose 1990 median family income was less
than 80 percent of the 1990 median family income of
their MSA were classiﬁed as loans to lower-income
neighborhoods. Similarly, loans for properties in cen-
sus tracts with more than 20 percent minority resi-
dents in 1990 were classiﬁed as loans to minority
(black, Asian, Hispanic, Native American, and ‘‘other
race’’) neighborhoods. The race of the primary appli-
cant was used to determine minority borrower loans,
and loans to borrowers whose income was below
80 percent of the current-year median family income
of their MSA were classiﬁed as loans to lower-
income borrowers.
Under current law, most institutions with ofﬁces in
MSAs are required to report all their mortgage lend-
ing regardless of location but to provide geographic
detail only for loans originated in metropolitan areas.
Thus, the information needed to determine lending
to lower-income and minority neighborhoods was
available only for counties in MSAs. Consequently
we restricted the dataset to these counties. Further,
because the number and boundaries of MSAs
changed slightly from 1993 to 1997, the dataset was
limited to the 726 counties that were part of MSAs in
both 1993 and 1997.28 These counties represent about
20 percent of all counties in the United States but
contain 78 percent of the total population and 70 per-
cent of the banking ofﬁces.
A further step had to be taken to align the banking
ofﬁce and lending data. Banking institutions report
their ofﬁces as of June 30 of each year but ﬁle
HMDA reports on a calender-year basis. The institu-
tion’s current structure is used for each ﬁling. Thus,
for example, if two banking institutions merged on
December 15, they would ﬁle a consolidated HMDA
ﬁling on December 31 showing their combined lend-
ing for the whole year. However, their branch ofﬁce
ﬁling, done as of the previous June 30, would show
them as separate institutions. To reconcile these dif-
ferences, the institution’s structure as of the end of
the year was used to classify bank branches and to
determine those counties where in our construct they
had a CRA obligation. These numbers may differ
from the actual location of ofﬁces at the end of the
year to the extent that banking institutions may have
opened or closed ofﬁces in the six-month period
between June 30 and December 31.
The ﬁnal information needed for the study was to
determine the appropriate structure to use in classify-
ing banking institutions and to determine which insti-
tutions were involved in consolidation during the
1993–95 and 1995–97 study periods. Transactions
and structure information recorded in the Federal
Reserve Board’s NIC database was used for this
purpose. For each of the three-year study periods
used in the analysis, institutions were initially classi-
ﬁed by their membership in banking organizations as
of December 31 of the ﬁrst year of the study period
(1993 or 1995). These organizations included bank
and thrift holding companies and foreign bank
payment groups (commercial banks chartered in the
United States that are subsidiaries of a common for-
eign bank). Both lending and ofﬁce data were con-
solidated at the organization level. Thus, for exam-
ple, if any banking institution member of a bank
holding company had an ofﬁce in a county, the orga-
nization was deemed to have a CRA obligation there.
Similarly, all home purchase lending in the county,
including lending by mortgage bank or ﬁnance com-
pany subsidiaries of the holding company and by all
its member banks and their subsidiaries, was included
in determining the organization’s total home pur-
chase lending in the county. The size of an organi-
zation was computed as the sum of the assets of its
member banking institutions.29 Banking institutions
that were not members of a larger organization were
treated as independent organizations.
A similar method was used to reclassify banking
institutions by their membership in organizations at
the end of each of the three-year study periods. A
banking institution that merged into another insti-
tution would be reclassiﬁed as part of the acquiring
institution, for example, and members of a holding
company acquired by another holding company
would similarly be reclassiﬁed as part of the acquir-
ing holding company.
All organizations (or institutions) with different
membership at the beginning and end of each study
period were deemed to have undergone a ‘‘consolida-
28. To correspond to the taxonomy used by the Bureau of the
Census in constructing county-level economic data, information for
some counties was combined. Primarily this involved consolidating
some independent cities in Virginia with their surrounding counties.
29. This amount may differ somewhat from the total assets reported
by bank and thrift holding companies for their combined operations.
However, consolidated information was not available for foreign bank
payment groups; consequently we decided to use a common basis in
estimating an organization’s size.
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institutions and holding companies that acquired or
merged with previously independent banking institu-
tions or holding companies. It does not include, how-
ever, mergers among subsidiaries of the same holding
company, because they were already members of
the same organization at the beginning of the period.
Nor does it include acquisitions of nonbank afﬁliates,
such as mortgage or ﬁnance companies.
For some of the analysis it was necessary to differ-
entiate between the ‘‘acquirer’’ and ‘‘acquired’’ com-
ponents of a consolidation. These determinations
were not always apparent from the record. Conse-
quently, we decided to designate the largest compo-
nent of an organization (as measured by its asset size
at the beginning of the period) as the ‘‘acquirer.’’ All
other components were treated as ‘‘acquired.’’ Thus if
four banking institutions merged into a common
holding company over the study period, the institu-
tion with the most assets in the beginning of the
period would be deemed to have acquired the other
three.
Consolidations were measured at the county level.
A consolidation was deemed to have occurred in the
county only if a banking institution (or organization)
with an ofﬁce in the county at the beginning of the
period was acquired by another institution (or organi-
zation) during the period. If the acquiring organiza-
tion also had ofﬁces in the county at the beginning of
the period it was treated as a within-county consolida-
tion; if the acquiring organization had ofﬁces within
the MSA, but not the county, it was treated as a
within-MSA-but-not-county consolidation. Otherwise
the merger was treated as an out-of-MSA consolida-
tion. Note that under this deﬁnition, an organization
was considered to have undergone a consolidation in
a county in which only the acquiring component of
the organization had ofﬁces at the beginning of the
period.
Finally, the change in lending for those counties
where organizations underwent consolidation was
computed by comparing the sum of the lending in a
county by all components of the organization in the
ﬁrst year of the study period (1993 or 1995) with the
lending reported by the overall organization in the
county in the ﬁnal year (1995 or 1997). Again, only
those counties with acquired components were con-
sidered in making this calculation.
30. A few institutions were liquidated in each of the study periods.
Similarly, a number of new (de novo) institutions were formed. Cases
of both types were excluded from the analysis. Moreover, an organiza-
tion acquiring a de novo bank is not treated as having undergone a
merger because the de novo institution did not exist at the beginning
of the period.
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